The Ninth Circuit reversed a Tacoma district court’s affirmation of an ALJ’s dismissal of a veteran’s disability claim. Daniel Berry, a military veteran, filed a claim for disability insurance benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 423 and supplemental security income benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1382. His claim was denied by the ALJ who concluded that whether Berry could pass a drug test was irrelevant to the determination of disability under sections 423 and 1382.
Berry worked for about 14 years as a military communications and computer supervisor and 6 years as a courier driver (Slip Opinion pg. 3). He left his job in 2000 and sough treatment for low back pain and an abnormal gait. The VA determined that Berry was entitled to “individual unemployability” based on his inability to pass a drug test due to his pain medications. Berry applied for social security disability in 2005; the SSA denied his claim. Berry sought review and at a 2007 hearing the ALJ concluded that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles didn’t mention drug testing as a requirement for his previous work as a courier. The ALJ therefore found that because Berry could return to his past relevant work as a courier he was not disabled. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s findings and conclusion.
The SSA’s regulations (a sequential evaluation for assessing disability claims described in 20 C.F.R. 404.1520) explain that “if you can still do your past relevant work, we will find that you are not disabled” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). To make this determination the SSA compares its “assessment of your residual functional capacity with the physical and mental demands of your past relevant work.” Id. § 404.1560(b); see also id. § 404.1520(f) (same). Applying this standard the ALJ and district court found the drug screening merely a hiring practice relevant to whether Berry could obtain his past work but not relevant to whether he could perform it (pg. 5).
The Ninth Circuit rejected what it described as a “restricted readings of the law” (Id.). The court held that a “mandatory requirement that employers cannot hire people with a certain level of pain medication in their blood is in essence a physical demand of the job” (Id.). The court further focused on language under § 423(d)(2)(A), which states that an individual is disabled “only if his physical or mental impairment [is] of such severity that he is . . . unable to do his previous work [or] engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work . . . regardless of . . . whether he would be hired if he applied for work.” (pg. 6) The court concluded that the “language excluding consideration of whether a claimant who sought work would in fact be hired cannot be construed to include a hiring practice that is directly tied to the claimant’s disability.” (pg. 6). Any other reading the court cautioned would defeat the entire statutory scheme.
The main issue of disability hearings is often the extent of physical impairment. The court on these facts equates pain medication in the blood stream as an impairment to performing the job, which makes sense, why else would employers screen for drugs? This reading of the law appears more common sense then novel. It’s also nice to find a case that comes after a final determination of the merits and not on summary judgment.
No comments:
Post a Comment